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AVIATION INSURANCE EXCLUSIONS - SHOULD A
CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE LOSS
AND EXCLUSION BE REQUIRED TO DENY
COVERAGE?
TIMOTHY MARK BATES
S EVERAL COURTS DISAGREE on the issue of
whether an unambiguous aviation insurance policy ex-
clusion requires a causal connection between the loss and
exclusion in order for the insurer to deny coverage.' Air-
A causal connection is not required with unambiguous aviation exclusions in
Alaska, California, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Carolina, New Mexico, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. See National
Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Bequette, 280 F. Supp. 842 (D. Alaska 1968), af'd, 429
F.2d 896 (9th Cir. 1970) (applying Alaska law); Arnold v. Globe Indem. Co., 416
F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1969) (applying Kentucky law); Di Santo v. Enstrom Helicopter
Corp., 489 F. Supp. 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Western Food Prod. Co., Inc. v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 10 Kan. App. 2d 375, 699 P.2d 579 (1985); Bellefonte Under-
writers Ins. Co. v. Alfa Aviation, Inc., 310 N.C. 471, 312 S.E.2d 426 (1984); Secur-
ity Mut. Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 99 N.M. 638, 662 P.2d 639 (1983); Ochs v.
Avemco Ins. Co., 54 Or. App. 768, 636 P.2d 421 (1981); Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Bright, 106 Cal. App. 3d 282, 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1980); United States Aviation
Underwriters, Inc. v. Rex Ray Corp., 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,625 (Mass. 1979);
Macalco, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 550 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Omaha Sky
Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610, 204 N.W.2d 162
(1973); Grigsby v. Houston Fire Casualty Ins. Co., 133 Ga. App. 572, 148 S.E.2d
925 (1966); Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 115, 40 N.W.2d
90 (1949).
States that do require a causal connection with unambiguous aviation exclu-
sions are Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa, Florida, Illinois, Mississippi,
Montana, South Carolina, and Texas. See Migues v. Universal Airways, Inc., 18
Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,250 (S.D. Miss. 1982); Bayers v. Omni Aviation Managers,
Inc., 510 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mont. 1981); National Ins. Underwriters v. King Craft
Custom Prod., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ala. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 1393 (5th
Cir. 1974); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Chung, 388 F. Supp. 142 (D. Hawaii 1975); Ameri-
can States Ins. Co. v. Byerly, 456 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. 111. 1978); Global Aviation
Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); O'Connor v. Pro-
prietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Puckett v. United States
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plane policies frequently exclude coverage for accidents
that occur when the insured violates certain Federal Avia-
tion Administration2 regulations (FARs) .3 A typical spe-
cific exclusion requires that an airplane have a standard
airworthiness certificate.4  When an airplane crashes be-
cause of the covered peril of pilot negligence, 5 but the air-
plane lacks a current airworthiness certificate, 6 the
question then becomes whether the insurer must pay
under the policy because of pilot negligence, or whether it
can deny coverage because the airworthiness certificate
has expired.7
Some jurisdictions allow denial of coverage with unam-
biguous exclusions," because the insurer did not assume
Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984); Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 1), petition for review denied, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Pickett, 412
So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1982); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C. 282, 237
S.E.2d 358 (1977); Ranger Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 25 Ariz. App. 426, 544 P.2d 250
(1976).
2 The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible for promulgating airline
safety regulations. With the creation of the Department of Transportation in
1966, the Federal Aviation Agency became the Federal Aviation Administration.
R. KANE & A. VOSE, AIR TRANSPORTATION 5-5 (1977)[hereinafter KANE & VOSE].
-1 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1982). This act
empowers the FAA to control safety regulations regarding airplanes. Id.
4 FAA Certification Procedures for Products and Parts, 14 C.F.R. § 21.181 (a) (1)
(1986) provides: "Standard airworthiness certificates... are effective as long as
the maintenance, preventive maintenance, and alterations are performed in ac-
cordance with parts 43 and 91 of this chapter .. " 14 C.F.R. § 91.165 (1986)
provides: "Each owner or operator of an aircraft shall have that aircraft inspected
as prescribed in subpart D or § 91.169 of this part .... ." 14 C.F.R.
§ 91.169(a)(1986) provides: "[N]o person may operate an aircraft unless, within
the preceding 12 calendar months, it has had - (1) an annual inspection in ac-
cordance with Part 43 of this chapter .... " Id.
5 A "peril" is the event which causes a loss, such as fire, windstorm, collision,
etc. See AMERICAN STATES GLOSSARY or INSURANCE TERMS 13 (1983). A "covered
peril" exists when the insured transfers the risk of loss by a specific peril to the
insurer in consideration for a premium. See id. at 5.
6 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Because coverage existed for pilot negligence, the insured argued that recov-
ery for this insured peril was allowed under the contract. See Puckett v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. 1984). The insurer's counter-
argument was that without the valid airworthiness certificate, coverage did not
exist for any risk associated with the flight. Id. See also Hagglund & Aurthur Cover-
age Problems in Aviation Policies, 23 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 4 (Summer 1973).
8 Courts use five different approaches to determine whether provisions in an
insurance contract are ambiguous: (1) the general rule of contract construction;
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the risk of the airplane flying without the FAA certificate.'
However, other jurisdictions require payment under the
covered peril of pilot negligence, unless the omission of
the airworthiness certificate caused the accident.10 These
courts theorize that requiring a causal connection pre-
vents insurers from denying coverage and receiving a
windfall based on a technical defense."
To illustrate this issue, assume that a plane crashes on
the border between New Mexico and Texas. If pilot neg-
ligence caused the crash, and the plane's airworthiness
certificate expired prior to the crash, then determining
which state law controls dictates whether the insured re-
covers. New Mexico, which follows the majority view,
does not require a causal connection, so the insured
would not recover because the policy excludes flying with
an invalid airworthiness certificate. 12 In Texas, a minority
view jurisdiction, the insured recovers unless the invalid
airworthiness certificate causally connects to the crash. 13
This comment discusses the conflict by looking at four
areas: (1) history of aviation insurance; (2) exclusions con-
(2) the doctrine of contra proferentem; (3) adhesion; (4) reasonable expectations; and
(5) the "wayfaring fool" doctrine. See K. YORK &J. WHELEN, INSURANCE LAW 32-
79 (1982) [hereinafter YORK & WHELEN]. For a general discussion of these provi-
sions, see YORK & WHELEN.
9 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
1o See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
I A technical defense is a term of art which means that an insurer denies cover-
age based on a provision of the policy which does not have a substantial connec-
tion with the loss. See, e.g., Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936,
938 (Tex. 1984). In discussing technical defenses the Texas Supreme Court
noted:
It would be against public policy to allow the insurance company in
that situation to avoid liability by way of a breach that amounts to
nothing more than a technicality. If we held otherwise: it would ac-
tually be to the insurer's advantage that the insured failed to renew
the airworthiness certificate. In such event, the insurer would collect
a premium but would have no exposure to risk because the policy
would no longer be effective.
Id. (quoting Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 1),petition
for review denied, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Pickett, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982)).
12 Security Mut. Casualty Co. v. O'Brien, 662 P.2d 639 (N.M. 1983). For a dis-
cussion of the case, see infra notes 163-188 and accompanying text.
'1- Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984). For a
discussion of the case, see infra notes 190-213 and accompanying text.
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trasted with warranties, conditions, and representations;
(3) antitechnical statutes; and (4) public policy arguments.
The first section, history of aviation insurance, gives a his-
torical background of the impact of the FARs on the draft-
ing and interpretation of aviation insurance policies. This
examination of aviation insurance history shows how avia-
tion exclusions evolved and the reasons for their promul-
gation. The second section explains the differences
between insurance terms. These differences are impor-
tant because the legal effect of the various terms signifi-
cantly impacts whether the insured recovers.
The final two sections are the crux of the conflict be-
tween the courts. Section three shows why the courts are
split on whether exclusions are controlled by antitechnical
statutes. If exclusions fall under the statute, then a causal
connection is usually required to deny coverage. Because
most statutes do not explicitly apply to exclusions, the in-
terpretation of the statute by the court is crucial. The
fourth section discusses the issue of public policy. Some
courts hold that even if antitechnical statutes do not ap-
ply, public policy requires a causal connection.
I. HISTORY OF AVIATION INSURANCE
A. Beginning of Aviation Insurance
On December 17, 1903, Wilbur and Orville Wright
completed the first successful flight, without insurance, at
Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. 4 Nine years later, Lloyds of
London wrote the first aviation insurance policy.' 5 The
policy covered damage to persons and property, but ex-
cluded physical damage to the airplane.' 6 In 1917, the
Queens Insurance Company of North America (acquired
14 See D. STEWART, AVIATION INSURANCE IX (1946)[hereinafter STEWART].
Id.
R. FLOWER & M. JONES, LLOYDS OF LONDON 142 (1974). Lloyds' first stan-
dardized aviation policy, called the "White Wings" policy, still exists at the
LLoyds' library. Id. Airplane hull insurance was not available, but the policy of-
fered third party liability insurance for injury to persons or property caused by the
airplane crash. Id.
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later by the Royal-Globe Insurance Companies) wrote the
first hull insurance.' 7 By 1920, at least five major under-
writing companies entered the new aviation insurance
market. 18 After several disastrous transatlantic flights in
the 1920's,' 9 the demand for aviation insurance grew to
the point that three major aviation insurance pools 20
formed to underwrite and study the risks associated with
this new product. 2 1 These first policies borrowed most of
their provisions from various fire and automobile policies
and added a few special endorsements22 to fit particular
aviation risks. 23
B. Modern Aviation Insurance
The modern era of aviation insurance began after
World War 11.24 Aircraft expertise gained during the war
helped produce higher quality airplanes and made air-
plane production easier and more cost efficient. 25 An avi-
,7 Hull insurance consists of insuring the airplane itself from physical damage.
STEWART, supra note 14, at X. There are 3 basic divisions of aviation insurance: (1)
insurance covering physical damage to the airplane; (2) insurance covering dam-
age to third parties caused by the aircraft; and (3) personal accident insurance.
See id. See also S. SPEISER & C. KRAUSE, 3 AVIATION TORT LAW § 22:2 (1980) [here-
inafter SPEISER & KRAUSE].
18 See STEWART, supra note 14, at X.
19 See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 17, at 22:2.
20 Id. The three pools were (1) The United States Insurance Group (U.S.A.I.G.)
formed on July 1, 1928; (2) The Associated Aviation Underwriters; and (3) The
Aero Insurance Underwriters (A.I.U.), which split up in 1947. Id.
21 Id.
22 An endorsement is an amendment attached to and made a part of the insur-
ance contract for the purpose of changing the original terms - either to restrict
or expand coverage. AMERICAN STATES GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 5 (1977).
See H. LEWIS, AVIATION & INSURANCE (1920). Aviation insurance was comparable
to boat insurance so marine insurance language was used. That is one reason why
insurance covering damage to the airplane is called "hull" insurance. See STEW-
ART, supra note 14, at X. Aircraft liability insurance did not use marine insurance
terms but followed the automobile policy; therefore, the first aviation policies
were a mixture of boat and automobile policies. Id.
23 See LEWIS, supra note 22, at 39. One example of a special endorsement par-
ticular to aviation risks is coverage for "forced landings." Id. A "forced landing"
is distinguished from an emergency landing because in an emergency landing the
pilot still has control over the airplane engines, whereas, in a forced landing a
pilot must land due to engine failure. Id.
24 See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 17, at 5.
2.5 Id.
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ation boom began as thousands of military-trained pilots
and mechanics returned to the United States to find an
unlimited supply of inexpensive war surplus aircraft and
cheap fuel.26 This aviation boom created an increase in
the demand for sophisticated aviation insurance.2 7
While the demand for aviation insurance grew, ad-
vances in technology and statistics made the risks associ-
ated with airplane accidents visibly more complex. 28
Better technology produced high-speed, high-cost air-
planes manufactured with more complicated designs, en-
gineering, and construction. 29 This rise in technology
required the underwriter3 0 to be more sophisticated in the
determination of why an airplane crashes. Along with the
risks associated with higher technology, the underwriters
received statistics from past crashes to help assess future
premiums. 3' These statistics revealed that a single crash
easily resulted in expensive damage claims, so premiums
increased.32 As the aviation industry grew, insurers devel-
oped an untenable dependency on aviation experts for
evaluating risks and handling aviation claims.3 3 To end
some of the dependency on experts, insurers began defer-
ring to the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). With
26 Id. Also, with the 1930's depression over, many people returned from the
war with money to spend on consumer items. Id. The time was ripe for airplanes
to take on a vital role in the economy by transporting people, supplies, and agri-
cultural products. Id.
27 See STEWART, supra note 14, at XI.
28 Id. As airplane technology increased with greater speeds, distances, and
weight, so did the risk of damage. Statistics of crashes showed some underwriters
that their predictions of losses were incorrect. Id.
29 N. TANEJA, THE COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 7 (1981). World War II was
responsible for rapid technical and operational development of transport aircraft.
Id. New aircraft such as the DC-14 and Lockheed Constellation possessed higher
payload capacity, range, and speed. Id. Also, refinements were made to radio
communications, navigational aids, instrument flying, and airport facilities. Id.
so See AMERICAN STATES GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 17 (1977). An under-
writer is a person with the duty to select risks that are insurable, and to determine
in what amounts and on what terms the insurer will accept the risks. Id.
il V. ROLLO, AVIATION LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 120-23 (1979).
12 R. FLOWER & M.JONES, LLOYDS OF LONDON 142 (1974). Crashes were "ten-a-
penny" and most underwriters underestimated the crash damages. Id.
.- Id. at 143.
COMMENT
the advent of the FARs, 3 4 the underwriters became unwill-
ing to insure airplanes flying in violation of the regula-
tions;3 15 therefore, they used conditions, warranties, and
exclusions to define the insurable risks covered by the avi-
ation policy.36
Along with the increased demand for aviation insurance
came the regulation of airplanes by the federal govern-
ment.37 In 1926, Congress passed the United States' first
legislation regulating aviation .3  The Air Commerce Act
of 1926 s3 gave the federal government power over the
operation and maintenance of the airway system, 40 as well
as power over all aids to air navigation.4 1 Furthermore,
the legislation gave the Department of Commerce the
duty and power to develop safety regulations.4 2 The De-
partment of Commerce delegated the duty to the newly
established Bureau of Air Commerce, 43 which later be-
came the Civil Aeronautics Board.44 Today the Federal
Aviation Administration 45 controls this function.
Some of the first safety regulations promulgated in-
cluded certification and medical examination of pilots, 46
as well as registration and licensing of aircraft.47 The in-
surance companies responded by putting a "statutory vio-
-' N. TANEJA, THE COMMERCIAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 5 (1981). The Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938 placed the development, regulation, and control of air carriers
under the jurisdiction of a single administrative body, the Civil Aeronautics
Board. Id. The CAB developed federal aviation regulations. Id.
-5 See, e.g., STEWART, supra note 14, at 15.
3, Id. at 71.
37 See SPEISER & KRAUSE, supra note 17, at 5.
38 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 344, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
39 Id.
4o See generally Senate Committee on Commerce Report on the Air Commerce




44 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973, 985.
4 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1982). The FAA
is under the Department of Transportation and not the Department of Com-
merce. Id.
41 See KANE & VOSE, supra note 2, at 5-5.
4d7 d.
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lation" exclusion in airplane policies. This exclusion
provided for suspension of coverage for losses occurring
when the plane violated civil air regulations. 48 The courts
upheld these broad general exclusion clauses through the
1940's for two reasons. First, courts had little knowledge
of aviation. Second, courts considered aviation danger-
ous enough to require strict adherence to all civil air
regulations .49
Nevertheless, federal safety regulations became more
numerous and complex after Congress passed the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938.50 The 1938 Act gave the avia-
tion industry a strong set of regulations to plan for future
development. 5' After twenty years of severe airplane
crashes,52 Congress revised the Civil Aeronautics Act into
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 3 The purpose of the
revision was to increase aviation safety. 54 With this man-
date to promote safety and with additional money from
Congress,55 the FAA put forth a serious effort to avoid the
past newspaper publicity of horrible aviation collisions.56
Necessarily, safety regulations proliferated with complete
requirements concerning every potential harmful activity
related to aviation.5 7
Over the next few years, the number of air safety regu-
lations increased to the point that nearly all accidents in-
48 E.g., Kilburn v. Union Marine & Gen. Ins. Co., 326 Mich. 115, 40 N.W.2d 90
(1949).
49 McGhee, Flying Blind: The Medical Certificate Warranty and General Aviation Insur-
ance Exclusions, 5 AIR L. 211, 212 (1980).
- See KANE & VOSE, supra note 2, at 5-14.
.51 Id.
.12 Id. at 6-1, 6-3.
- Id. The Federal Aviation Act basically mirrors the Civil Aeronautics Act ex-
cept that the FAA has expanded power in safety regulations. For a discussion of
several of the crashes that led to higher safety standards and the passing of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, see id. at 6.
54 Id.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
. See KANE & VOSE, supra note 2, at 6-2. One of these crashes was a mid-air
collision over the Grand Canyon between a TWA Constellation and a United Air-
lines DC-7. Id. Both airplanes fell into the canyon. Id.
.17 McGhee, supra note 49, at 212.
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volved the violation of at least one regulation.58 Insurers
found it easy and tempting to avoid coverage for airplane
accidents based on a violation of a federal regulation.59 In
response, the courts and legislatures departed from their
previous approval of general exclusion clauses by outlaw-
ing these clauses on public policy grounds. 60  Because
nearly all accidents involved a violation of at least one reg-
ulation, the courts found it unfair to allow insurers the use
of these broad catch-all exclusions to deny coverage. 61
The unfairness resulted from the inability of the insured
to comply with every FAR. This inability resulted in denial
of insurance benefits.6 1 Instead of imposing a causal con-
nection between the catch-all exclusion and the loss,
courts simply disallowed general exclusions. 63 Neverthe-
less, courts upheld specific exclusions where the insured
had the ability to comply. 64
Most insurers wrote specific exclusions into their avia-
tion policies 65 that excluded coverage for any airplane
accident involving a plane that did not have a valid air-
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. See Roach v. Churchman, 431 F.2d 849 (8th Cir. 1970). The Roach court
reasoned that these general exclusion clauses made the insurance contract illusory
since nearly all aviation accidents involved at least one violation of the FARs. Id.
at 853. See also Petkoff, Statutory Restrictions on Exclusions Contained in Aviation Policies,
27 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 265 (Spring 1977).
6 See Petkoff, supra note 60, at 266-67. Specific exclusions are different from
general exclusions based on their scope. Id. Broad exclusions are worded to ex-
clude almost everything, whereas specific exclusions are more definable and nar-
row in scope. Id. See also Threlkeld v. Ranger Ins. Co., 156 Cal. App. 3d 1, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 529 (1984). In Threlkeld, the exclusion required the airworthiness certificate
to be in "full force and effect" while the airplane was in operation. The insured
argued that the exclusion was ambiguous because it might be construed to include
all relevant FARs concerning flight operations. The court noted that the interpre-
tation rendered the contract illusory since almost all crashes involve the breach of
at least one FAR. The court rejected the insured's ambiguity analysis and held the
exclusion was specific because it referred only to the airworthiness certificate. Be-
cause the insured did not get the airplane inspected, its airworthiness certificate
expired, and coverage did not exist. Id. at 532.
62 See Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610,
204 N.W.2d 162, 164 (1973).
". See Petkoff, supra note 60, at 266-77. See also McGhee, supra note 49, at 215.
" See McGhee, supra note 49, at 215.
' See STEWART, supra note 14, at 20.
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worthiness certificate.66 The underwriters theorized that
an insured's airplane had to be properly certified as a pre-
requisite to being riskworthy.6 7 Furthermore, insurers
modeled this specific exclusion from the first regulations
promulgated in the Air Commerce Act of 1926 68 and still
embodied in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.69 This spe-
cific exclusion is now the focal point of litigation concern-
ing whether a causal connection is needed between the
specific exclusion and the accident in order for the insurer
to deny coverage.70
Once a valid specific exclusion is raised and its violation
proved by the insurer, most jurisdictions allow the denial
of insurance benefits even if no causal connection exists
between the accident and the violation. 7' In other words,
if a policy specifically excludes coverage when the airplane
does not have a valid airworthiness certificate, and an un-
certified plane crashes, the insured cannot recover under
the policy even though the crash was caused entirely by
circumstances unrelated to certification, such as pilot er-
ror.72 However, one commentator points out that due to
the windfall that will otherwise occur for the insurer, the
modern trend should require a causal connection with all
insurance policy provisions.75
In summation, aviation insurance began in a regulatory-
free world.7 ' As the federal government became active in
aviation safety, the number and complexity of regulations
Id. 14 C.F.R. § 21.181(a)(1) (1986); see supra note 4 and accompanying text
for a discussion of a standard airworthiness certificate.
67 See STEWART, supra note 14, at 23.
- Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 568. See, e.g., Comment, Florida's "An-
titechnical" Statute. Should Insurance Exclusions Be Included?, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 737
(1983).
w, The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
7o See Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984).
In Texas alone, two cases were litigated between 1982-1984, which directly con-
cerned this issue. Id. See supra note 1 for a listing of which states do or do not
require causation.
7' See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
72 Id.
74 J. APPLEMAN, 6A INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4146 (1972).
74 See STEWART, supra note 14, at IX.
COMMENT
grew.75 Insurers in the past used these regulations as a
basis for broad general exclusions in aviation policies.
Currently, courts allow only specific exclusions because
the numerosity and complexity of regulations dictate that
any crash probably violates at least one regulation.76 The
disputed question between the courts is whether these
specific exclusions require a causal connection between
the exclusion and the loss for the insurer to deny
coverage.
II. EXCLUSIONS CONTRASTED WITH WARRANTIES,
CONDITIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS
The terms "warranty," "condition," "representation,"
and "exclusion" cause a lot of confusion. Policy "repre-
sentations ''77 "warranties,''78 and "conditions ' 79 are dif-
ferent from "exclusions. "'80 The critical difference is the
legal effect of a breach of one of these provisions by the
insured.8 ' The determination of whether the insured re-
covers or forfeits proceeds of the policy depends on
whether a provision is a "condition, .... representation,"
"warranty" or "exclusion. '8 2 Because courts do not like
forfeiture8 3 and construe ambiguity in insurance policies
against the insurers, 4 confusion exists in applying and
construing different types of provisions.8 " An exploration
of terminology is needed to fully appreciate the difference
between the policy provisions.
A "representation" is a statement made by the insured
75 See KANE & VoSE, supra note 2, at 5-5.
76 See Petkoff, supra note 60, at 266-67.





82 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D 35:17, 35:44 (rev. ed. 1985). See infra notes 84-97
and accompanying text.
83 See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966). See also J. APPLEMAN, 6A INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4146 (1972).
- See Gray, 419 P.2d at 171.
8- See W. YOUNG, INSURANCE 78 (1971).
1986]
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in an application for insurance upon which the insurer ba-
ses its decision to accept or reject the risk at a certain pre-
mium.8 6 Unlike warranties, conditions, and exclusions,
which are part of the insurance contract itself,87 a repre-
sentation is a statement made prior to the formation of
the insurance contract.88 Therefore, the insured's state-
ment prior to the issuance of the policy that the airplane
has a valid airworthiness certificate, is a representation.89
If this representation is materially false, then the misrep-
resentation renders the policy void at the time the insurer
realizes the false statement. 90
Two types of conditions exist in an insurance policy:
condition precedent and condition subsequent. 9' A "con-
dition precedent" is an act or event that must occur after
the terms of the contract are agreed upon in order for a
policy to become effective.92 An example is a provision
stating that the insurance policy is not effective until the
first premium is paid. Without this conditional event or
payment, the insured does not have a right to the policy
proceeds.93 "Conditions subsequent" are those acts or
events which may occur after an effective policy exists.94
After the insured pays the premium and accepts the pol-
icy, conditions subsequent impose obligations on the in-
sured. The policy becomes ineffective if the insured
breaches the obligations.9 5 For example, a policy may
contain a condition subsequent stating that the expiration
of the airworthiness certificate voids the policy. 96
A "warranty" is a promise made by the insured that the
existence of certain facts, essential to the validity of the
8°, See 43 AM. JUR. 2d Insurance §§ 1011-1037 (1982).
87 Id.
a8 Id. at § 1023.
- See id.
90 Id.







insurance contract, are literally true.97 The insured's
promise not to fly the airplane without a valid airworthi-
ness certificate is an example of a warranty.98 If the in-
sured breaches this warranty, the insurer may void the
policy. The policy is voidable even if the breach of war-
ranty does not prejudice the insurer.99
An "exclusion" provides that a certain risk or situation
is not covered by the policy. 00 No promises are made by
the insured or insurer. 10 1 An example is a provision stat-
ing that coverage does not exist under the policy for any
airplane flying without a valid airworthiness certificate. 10 2
The main distinction between these terms is that "ex-
clusions," unlike the other three provisions, are not
promises. 10 3 Exclusions simply state that no coverage ex-
ists under the policy when certain events or acts occur. 10 4
Warranties, conditions, and representations are promises
that certain events either have, will, or will not occur. 10 5 If
the promise is a warranty or condition then the materiality
of the breach is presumed.10 6 A breach of a condition ren-
ders the policy void, 10 7 and a breach of warranty renders
the policy voidable. 10 8 If the promise is a representation,
then the insurer must prove materiality or reliance on the
misrepresentation. 109
Because the determination of the identity of the provi-
sions directly affects whether the insured recovers,
insureds and insurers litigate the definition and construc-
97 Id. 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 35:2 (rev. ed. 1985).
0, See Note, Florida's "Antitechnical" Statute: Should Insurance Exclusions Be Included?,
10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 737, 738 (1983).
- Id. CoucH, supra note 97, at § 36:24.
loo See Note, supra note 98, at 739.
1O Id.
102 Id.
,o3 Id. at 738.
1o Id. at 739.
o. Id. at 738.
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tion of these provisions.)' 0 The boundaries of these
terms have become muddled and confused by lawyers and
judges."' Naturally, insureds argue that warranties, con-
ditions, and exclusions in the policy are really disguised
representations so that the insurer must show materiality
to avoid coverage. 1 2 Unethical insurers might play term
games by labeling true representations as warranties in
the policy in order to frustrate recovery after a slight
breach. " I3 Furthermore, courts generally disfavor insurers
avoiding coverage without a showing of materiality. Con-
sequently, the courts sometimes use an ambiguity analysis
to interpret warranties as representations." 4 The courts
achieve this result by relying on the old legal adage that
all ambiguity is construed against the writer of the con-
tract." 5 So a term may be labeled a condition or warranty
but arguably be a disguised representation." 6
In summation, whether a term is labeled a representa-
tion, warranty, condition, or exclusion may determine
whether the insured recovers. A misrepresentation must
be materially false for the insurer to void the policy." 7 A
slight breach of a condition or warranty is fatal to the in-
sured's claim." 8 The breach of the former makes the pol-
icy voidable," 9 while a breach of the latter voids the
policy. 20 An exclusion is distinct from all of the other
terms in that it is not a promise.' 2' It is a statement that
coverage does not exist for certain acts or events. 22
110 Id.
- Id.
112 See Comment, Misrepresentations and Nondisclosure in the Insurance Application,
13 GA. L. REV. 876, 878-79 (1979).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See YOUNG, supra note 85, at 82.
116 Id.
117 COUCH, supra note 97, at § 35:76.
118 See Note, supra note 98, at 739.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 738.
122 Id. at 739.
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III. ANTITECHNICAL STATUTES
A. Application of Antitechnical Statutes to Exclusions
In order to protect insureds and clear up the confusion
of insurance terminology, legislatures enacted "an-
titechnical" statutes. 12' These statutes provide the crite-
ria courts must use in determining whether a mis-
representation or breach of a condition or warranty will
defeat an insured's claim. 124 Although the statutes vary,
most are worded so that insurers must prove that the
breach of a warranty, condition, or representation is (1)
material;1 25 (2) contributes causally to the 1oss;126 (3) in-
volves fraud; 127 or (4) increases the insurer's risk.22 A typ-
ical antitechnical statute, enacted in 1943 by the state of
Nebraska, provides: 129
Policy provisions; misrepresentations; warranties; condi-
tions; effect. No oral or written misrepresentation or war-
ranty made in the negotiation for a contract or policy of
insurance by the insured, or in his behalf, shall be deemed
material or defeat or avoid the policy, or prevent its at-
taching, unless such misrepresentation or warranty
deceived the company to its injury. The breach of a war-
ranty or condition in any contract or policy of insurance
shall not avoid the policy nor avail the insurer to avoid
liability, unless such breach shall exist at the time of the
loss and contribute to the loss, anything in the policy or
contract of insurance to the contrary notwithstanding.
Because most states have similar antitechnical statutes,
the law defining warranties, representations, and condi-
tions is largely statutory.13 0 Because none of these stat-
utes expressly include exclusions,' 31 the majority of
123 Id. at 740. See also Petkoff, supra note 60, at 266.
124 See Note, supra note 98, at 739.
125 Id. at 740.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D 35:17, 35:44 (rev. ed. 1985).
121 NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-358 (1984).
-. , See Note, supra note 98, at 740.
1:41 Id.
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jurisdictions do not require a causal connection between
the exclusion and the loss for the insurer to deny cover-
age. 32 However, two state courts recently held that their
antitechnical statute applies with exclusions. 33
B. Florida's Approach to Antitechnical Statutes and Exclusions
Recently in Pickett v. Woods, 134 the Florida Court of Ap-
peals held that exclusions are controlled by Florida's an-
titechnical statute. 135 On October 6, 1974, Dr. Wilbur
Pickett, after playing golf, accepted a ride home in- a
friend's small single-prop plane.3 6  While flying home
they encountered bad weather, 37 and upon attempting to
land in instrument conditions, the plane crashed killing
the pilot and three passengers. 38 The pilot was not in-
strument-rated, 39 and the FAA concluded that pilot error
solely caused the crash. 40  The FAA further found that
the plane's airworthiness certificate had expired because
the last inspection of the plane occurred fifteen months
prior to the accident.' 4 ' The expired airworthiness certifi-
cate did not contribute in anyway to the crash. 142
Foremost Insurance Company denied coverage for the
crash due to the exclusion in the insured's policy which
132 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981),petition
for review denied, Foremost Ins. Co. v. Pickett, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982). See infra
notes 134-155 and accompanying text. See also Global Aviation Ins. Managers v.
Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985).
,.4 404 So. 2d at 1152 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 198 1), petition for review denied, Fore-
most Ins. Co. v. Pickett, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982).
135 Id. Florida's antitechnical statute states: A breach or violation by the insured
of any warranty, condition, or provision of any wet marine or transportation insurance
policy, contract of insurance, endorsement, or application therefore shall not
render void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to loss thereon, unless
such breach or violation increased the hazard by any means within the control of
the insured. 18B FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.409(2)(West 1984)(emphasis added).







read: "This policy does not apply: . . . 4. to any insured
(b) who operates or permits the operation of the aircraft,
while in flight, unless its airworthiness certificate is in full
force and effect...."-1 Dr. Pickett's widow brought suit
against Foremost Insurance Company and the insured pi-
lot.' 44 She claimed that the pilot was negligent and that
his insurer, Foremost, should pay under the pilot's avia-
tion policy for her damages. 145After the case was scheduled for trial, Foremost suc-
cessfully severed the insurance coverage issue. 46 The
sole issue concerning the validity of the airworthiness cer-
tificate went to a jury, and the court entered final judg-
ment in favor of Foremost. 47 Mrs. Pickett appealed the
judgment claiming that because the insurance coverage
exclusion lacked a causal connection to the crash, the trial
judge erred in denying her motion for directed verdict. 48
In support of her argument, Mrs. Pickett cited several
cases which required a causal connection between insur-
ance provisions and the loss before an insurer could deny
coverage.149 She portrayed these cases as a "growing
modern trend."'' 50 The courts cited based their holdings
on the existence of their states' antitechnical statute.
15
'
Because Florida also has an antitechnical statute, Mrs.
Pickett encouraged the Florida Court of Appeals to join
the "growing trend."'' 52 Foremost answered by citing a
long line of Florida and Fifth Circuit cases which clearly
established that a causal relationship is not required when
143 Id. at 742.
144 Id. at 741.




,49 See Pickett, 404 So. 2d at 1153. See supra note 1 for a list of courts requiring a
causal connection.
50 Pickett, 404 So.2d at 1153. See South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Collins, 269 S.C.
282, 237 S.E.2d 358 (1977) (this case is often cited as the beginning of the mod-
ern trend). But see Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Alfa Aviation, Inc., 310
N.C. 471, 312 S.E.2d 426 (1984).
1.,1 See Note, supra note 98, at 743.
1.52 Id.
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the provision in question is an exclusion.' 53 Foremost
further distinguished the "growing trend" cases by point-
ing out that they apply only to representations, condi-
tions, and warranties. They do not apply to exclusions.
1 5 4
The Florida Court of Appeals held that under the Flor-
ida antitechnical statute, exclusions as well as warranties
and conditions require a causal connection. 55  In inter-
preting the statute, the court recognized that the statute
addressed "warranties, conditions, and provisions," and
that the term "provisions" included exclusions.
5 6
Although the court failed to discuss the rationale for its
method of statutory construction, 57 it stated that because
the legislature apparently recognized the court's difficulty
with insurance terms, 58 the legislature must have in-
tended the term "provision" to include any material por-
tion of the policy. 59
In distinguishing Pickett, most state statutes do not in-
clude the word "provision.''t60 The majority of an-
titechnical statutes explicitly address only warranties,
conditions, and representations, and therefore, do not ap-
ply to exclusions. 161 However, if the particular antitechni-
cal statute applies to "provisions" or "stipulations" as
well as warranties, conditions, and representations, then
exclusions arguably are controlled by the antitechnical
15" Id.
154 Id.
1.1 Pickett, 404 So. 2d at 1153.
156 Id.
157 See Note, supra note 98, at 744. The court probably used ejusdem generis, the
well-founded rule of statutory interpretation. Under ejusdem generis, when a gen-
eral word follows a list of specific words, the general word is construed to include
any objects in the class of objects described by the specific words. Id. See R. DICK-
ERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234 (1975).
-8 Pickett, 404 So. 2d at 1153. See also Note, supra note 98, at 743-44.
-5, See Note, supra note 98, at 745.
See id. at 746.
See Omaha Sky Divers Parachute Club, Inc. v. Ranger Ins. Co., 189 Neb. 610,
204 N.W.2d 162 (1973) (holding that the Nebraska antitechnical statute only ap-







A. The Majority View
The majority view does not require a causal connection
between the exclusion and the loss. An example of the
majority view is Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. O'Brien.'63
In 1975, Security Casualty Co. issued Mr. O'Brien two
aviation insurance policies. 16 One policy provided for
hull insurance, while the other provided Mr. O'Brien lia-
bility coverage. 6 5 Both policies contained an exclusion
clause stating that the policy did not apply "while the air-
craft is in flight, unless its Airworthiness Certificate is in
full force and effect."' 166 Mr. O'Brien leased the airplane
to Pegasus Aerial Sports. 67  Pegasus then rented the
plane to Ellsworth. 68 On July 14, 1979, Ellsworth col-
lided with another airplane over Albuquerque, New Mex-
ico. 169 Because the plane did not have its 1979 annual
inspection per FAA regulations, 170 the airworthiness cer-
1 See Global Aviation Ins. Managers v. Lees, 368 N.W.2d 209 (Iowa Ct. App.
1985). Iowa's antitechnical statutes states:
Any condition or stipulation in an application policy or contract of in-
surance, making the policy void before the loss occurs, shall not pre-
vent recovery thereon by the insured, if it shall be shown by the
plaintiff that the failure to observe such provision or the violation
thereof did not contribute to the loss.
IOWA CODE § 515.101 (1985) (emphasis added). The Global court, in construing
its antitechnical statute realized that its statute was broader than Nebraska's, but
not as broad as the Florida statute interpreted in Pickett. Because the Global court
chose to interpret the word "stipulation" to encompass "exclusions," aviation ex-
clusions are controlled by Iowa's antitechnical statute and must have a causal con-
nection to the loss to avoid coverage. See Global, 368 N.W.2d at 212.







170 Id. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.169 (1986) (providing that no person may operate an
aircraft unless it has had an annual inspection within the preceding twelve
months); See also 14 C.F.R. § 91.165 (1986) (providing that each owner or opera-
tor of an aircraft shall have that aircraft inspected as prescribed by § 91.169).
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tificate expired. The parties stipulated that the expired
certificate did not cause the crash.' 7 1
Security claimed that New Mexico law did not require a
causal connection between the exclusion (flying with an
expired airworthiness certificate) and the midair crash in
order to deny coverage. 17 2 After both lower courts ruled
in favor of O'Brien and held that a causal connection was
required, 173 the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed and
held that a causal connection is not required with an
exclusion. 174
While the court recognized the split of authority on this
issue, it rationalized that the majority view correctly por-
trayed New Mexico law for a number of reasons. 75 Justi-
fiably, courts construe ambiguity against the insurer and
dislike forfeiture. 76 However, the New Mexico Supreme
Court recognized that courts cannot simply ignore the
plain language of policy exclusions. 77 Even if the court
agreed that the insurer should not be allowed to avoid lia-
bility for an accident unrelated to the exclusion, it was
bound to follow legal precedent and longstanding public
policy. 78
The policy behind these exclusions is to encourage air-
craft owners to obtain annual inspections. 79  O'Brien
knew of the exclusion and that the insurer did not provide
coverage unless the plane received its annual inspec-
171 See O'Brien, 662 P.2d at 640.
172 Id. at 641.
17' Id.
174 Id. at 642.
175 Id.
17r Id. (citing Visco Flying Co. v. Hansen & Rowland, Inc., 184 Cal. App. 2d
829, 7 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1960)).
177 O'Brien, 662 P.2d at 642.
178 Id. at 641. The court stated: "[t]o hold otherwise would allow courts to ig-
nore the plain language of insurance policy exclusions whenever they feel an in-
surer should not be allowed to avoid liability for an accident unrelated to the
policy exclusion." Id.
170 Id. The court stated: "The policy behind such exclusions is clear and unam-
biguous. The exclusions encourage aircraft owners to obtain annual inspections
of their aircraft... These regulations prohibit an aircraft owner from flying his
aircraft unless an annual safety inspection is performed." Id.
[52
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tion.180 Because the insurance policy itself did not require
a causal connection,' 8' the court refused to judicially cre-
ate such a requirement. 82 The court stated:
We start with the proposition that our function is not to
write insurance contracts. We are not underwriters. We
must apply them as written by the parties, even though the
result compelled by the plain words used may appear or
be thought to appear to be unreasonable, unduly harsh, or
stringent. We cannot ignore them. We cannot substitute
others for them.'
83
The court concluded that Mr. O'Brien's policy must be
enforced as written, 84 and that a causal connection be-
tween the exclusion and the accident is not a requirement
in New Mexico for an insurer to deny coverage. 185
In summation, under the majority view, the courts
should not rewrite insurance policies even if they have a
desire to help the insured. 86 The courts'job is to enforce
unambiguous contractual exclusions. 8 7 According to the
majority view, because an exclusion is simply a clause stat-
ing a risk that is not covered instead of a promise, a logi-
cal reason does not exist to require a causal connection.188
B. The Minority View
A decision contrary to O'Brien 189 is Puckett v. United States
180 Id. The court stated: "Insurance coverage must not be afforded aircraft
owners who ignore or refuse to comply with established certification requirements
commonly part of policy exclusions." Id.
,81 Id.
182 Id. "Because no annual inspection was performed on O'Brien's aircraft, the
certificate lapsed and the policy exclusion was properly invoked. To hold other-
wise, we would have to rewrite the regulations or the insurance policy." Id.
183 Id. (quoting Electron Machine Corp. v. American Mercury Ins. Co., 297 F.2d
212, 214 (5th Cir. 1961)).
1- O'Brien, 662 P.2d at 642.
185 Id. at 641. The court stated that the parties may add a causal connection
requirement to the insurance contract. Id.
186 Id. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
187O'Brien, 662 P.2d at 642.
188 See United States Aviation Underwriters v. Rex Ray Corp., 15 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,630 (Mass. 1979).
9 O'Brien, 662 P.2d at 642.
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Fire Insurance Co. 190 The facts of Puckett are similar to
those in O'Brien because both airplanes crashed with inva-
lid airworthiness certificates. In both cases, the insured's
failure to pay for an annual inspection caused the invalid-
ity of the certificate. The Texas Supreme Court consoli-
dated Puckett with a similar case Marney v. United States Fire
Insurance Co. for argument. 19' These cases involved sepa-
rate crashes where both airplanes had invalid airworthi-
ness certificates at the time of the crash.' 92 Both suits
involved a denial of coverage by United States Fire Insur-
ance Company based on an exclusion of coverage while
flying with an invalid airworthiness certificate.19 In Puck-
ett, the plane crashed more than one month after its air-
worthiness certificate expired. 19 4 In Marney, the plane
crashed the day after its airworthiness certificate became
invalid. 195 The owner of the plane in Puckett testified that
he knew of the policy exclusion, but did not want to spend
the money for the inspection until he decided whether he
would sell the airplane. 96
In both cases the parties stipulated that the exclusion
did not have a causal connection to the crash. 9 7 The trial
court rendered summary judgment for United States Fire
Insurance Company on the basis that no causal connec-
tion is needed between the exclusion and the loss to avoid
coverage.' 98 Relying on Texas precedent, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court.' ° The Texas Supreme
Court reversed and declared that due to public policy, a
causal connection between the exclusion and accident is
678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
Brief of Amicus Curiae at 3, Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678
S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
192 Id. at 1-2.
193 Petitioners Application For Writ of Error at 7, Puckett v. United States Fire
Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
194 Id. at 5-7.
195 Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2, Puckett, 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).
'9o Reply Brief of Appellee at 7, Puckett, 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984).




required before the insurer may avoid coverage. 20 0 Fur-
thermore, the court disapproved of a 1976 Texas case
holding that representations required a causal connection
with the accident to avoid coverage, but exclusions did
not.
20 1
The Texas Supreme Court recognized the majority
view does not require a causal connection when the provi-
sion is an exclusion.20 2 Yet the court stated that failure to
require causation upon a breach of contract would be un-
conscionable. 0 Unconscionability results because the ab-
sence of a causal connection requirement gives the
insurer a technical defense. 4 The insurer would gain an
unfair advantage when the insured does not get an inspec-
tion. The insurer would collect the insured's premium
without any risk because all coverage is excluded.20 5
In reaching its public policy decision, the court looked
to the Texas antitechnical statute covering fire insurance
policies.2 6 Texas' antitechnical statute20 7 arguably in-
cludes exclusions because it addresses warranties, condi-
tions, and provisions like the Florida statute; however, the
200 Id. at 938.
201 Id. The court disapproved of Schepps Grocer Supply, Inc. v. Ranger Ins.
Co., 545 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Schepps, the
court addressed the principle issue whether "once an insurer asserts a policy ex-
clusion, it is necessary to prove a causal connection between the loss suffered and
the breach of the policy." Id. at 14. The court held that when an exclusion in an
insurance policy specifically suspends coverage in particular circumstances "the
question of a causal relation between [the] failure to adhere to the ... require-
ments and the loss is totally immaterial .... Id. at 16.
202 Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 937.
203 Id. at 938.
204 Id. But see id. at 940. The dissenting judges disagree that the insured's
breach is a mere technicality. The object of the policy provision is to require
compliance with federal safety regulations. Id.
205 Id. The court stated: "It would be against public policy to allow the insur-
ance company in that situation to avoid liability by way of a breach that amounts
to nothing more than a technicality." Id. Later the court citing Pickett v. Woods,
404 So. 2d 1152, 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), petitionfor review denied, Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Pickett, 412 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1982), stated: "it would actually be to the
insurer's advantage that the insured failed to renew the airworthiness certificate.
In such event, the insurer would collect a premium but would have no exposure to
risk because the policy would no longer be effective." Id.
206 Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938.
207 TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 6.14 (Vernon 1986).
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Texas statute is distinct from the Florida statute in a ma-
jor respect. The Texas statute solely addresses fire insur-
ance policies.20 Yet, the Texas Supreme Court stated
that this antitechnical statute should apply not only to fire
insurance policies, but also to aviation and arguably all
other insurance policies. 20 9 The Court held that as evi-
denced by the fire insurance antitechnical statute, the
Texas legislature intended public policy to require causa-
tion between material provisions and the loss in all insur-
ance policies. 21 0  Therefore, in Texas, public policy
demands a causal connection between exclusions and the
loss in all insurance polices before the insurer can deny
coverage.2 '
In summation, the minority view focuses on unconscio-
nability. The minority view jurisdictions believe that it is
against public policy to allow an insurer a technical de-
fense by not requiring a causal connection. 2  Allowing
this unconscionable result would benefit insurers because
insurers could collect premiums without exposure to
risk.213
V. CONCLUSION
The aviation industry has become highly regulated in
the areas of safety since its inception.1 4 The FAA re-
quires that airplanes have current airworthiness certifi-
cates. In order to comply, airplanes must be inspected
2 0 Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 940.
2- Id. at 938-40. The dissenting opinion states:
Today's decision means that insurance policies - life, casualty, fire
-though agreed upon by the insured and insurer, though author-
ized by the Board of Insurance, though clear and unambiguous, are
burdened with uncertain terms that this court may from time to time
determine should have been included in the parties' contract.
Id. at 940
210 Id. at 938-40.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 940. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
213 See Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 940.
214 See supra notes 2-8 and 37-56 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
annually.2 16
Most aviation insurance policies exclude coverage for
all flights if the insured airplane does not have a valid air-
worthiness certificate. These exclusions are different
from the policy provisions such as representations, war-
ranties, and conditions.21 7 Because of the confusion and
strategic effect surrounding the use of these terms, most
states have enacted antitechnical statutes. 218 These stat-
utes require that warranties, conditions, and representa-
tions must be material and causally connected to the loss
for the insurer to deny coverage.21 9 While these statutes
do not expressly include exclusions, the Florida Court of
Appeals determined that the Florida statute includes all
provisions of an insurance contract. Because an exclusion
is a provision, exclusions must be causally connected to
the loss to deny coverage.2 20
The majority of jurisdictions do not require a causal
connection with exclusions. 22  They recognize a differ-
ence between exclusions and other contract provisions.
One difference is that exclusions are not promises, but
statements that certain events or acts are not covered. 22 2
If these events or acts occur, then the courts refuse to re-
write the insurance policy to require a causal connec-
tion. 2 3 In other words, given the technical meaning of an
exclusion, a logical reason does not exist for courts to re-
quire a causal connection absent legislative mandate.22 4
In the past five years, a few courts have changed prior
law to require a causal connection with exclusions. 25
This change occurred because the alternative of not re-
quiring a causal connection gives the insurer a technical
216 Id.
217 See supra notes 77-122 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
219 Id.
220 See supra notes 134-162 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
222 Id. See supra notes 163-188 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 163-186 and accompanying text.
224 Id.
225 See supra note 1.
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defense. 26 If an insurer collects premiums while the air-
plane's airworthiness certificate is expired, the insurer is
not exposed to any risk.22 7 These minority jurisdictions
hold that this technical defense is unconscionable and
against public policy.2 28
While both viewpoints have some merit, the majority
viewpoint is more tenable from a legal standpoint. Over
the years insurance terms have produced much confusion
and litigation.229 To dispose of some of the confusion and
to protect insureds, state legislatures enacted anti-techni-
cal statutes. These statutes define warranties, conditions,
and representations, but do not address exclusions. Eas-
ily, the legislatures could have incorporated exclusions
into these statutes. Arguably, if they used the word "pro-
vision" then they left the question of exclusions to the
courts.
However, even if the question is left to the courts,
courts should not require a causal connection with exclu-
sions because exclusions are different. They are not
promises. They are statements that coverage never ap-
plies to airplanes when certain events or acts occur. Be-
cause the insured controls whether the plane gets
inspected, and thereby controls whether coverage applies,
a causal connection with specific exclusions is un-
necessary.
Most insureds comply with FAA requirements and an-
nually get their airplanes inspected. Others, like the in-
sured in Puckett,23 ° consciously disregard the FAA
inspection 231 because they do not want to pay to have
226 See supra notes 189-213 and accompanying text.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See Note, supra note 98, at 739.
230 Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 936.
2 1 Id. at 940. The insured testified that he knew of the exclusion but did not
want to pay for the inspection until he decided whether to sell the airplane. Id.
Robert G. Holt, co-owner of the airplane testified in his deposition about the rea-
son the insured plane was not inspected. He said:Q Do you know whether there was an annual inspection done be-
tween June 12 and June 18, 1981 -June 12, 1980 to July 18, 1981?
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their airplane inspected. 2  In these cases, where the ex-
clusion is unambiguous and conspicuous, courts should
not rewrite the insurance contract to include a causal con-
nection. The insured has willfully or negligently failed to
have his airplane inspected. He knows or should know
that any flight in an uninspected plane is not covered.233
Furthermore, the foundation of insurance is to provide
indemnity to insureds for covered losses. Exclusions state
what events or acts are not covered. Because a few in-
sureds decided not to get their airplanes inspected annu-
ally, per FAA regulations and their insurance policies, the
foundation of insurance has changed in the minority juris-
dictions. In those states, an insurer must carry the burden
and expense to prove a causal connection with an unam-
biguous exclusion, even though the insured knew and
willfully chose to run the risk of flying without cover-
age.234 These courts disservice the insureds of their state
A. There was not any done.Q. Do you know why it was not done?
A. Well, we had decided to sell the aircraft prior to the accident.
A. [W]e were trying to decide whether to sell the airplane with an
annual or without an annual. So this is often done. The mechanic
that was going to do the annual was on vacation in the latter part of
June so we didn't get it done. And we decided to go ahead and get it
done before we sold it so that whoever wanted to buy it could fly it.
Q. I assume then from what you are telling me, it was kind of a
proposition that you wanted not to spend the money on the annual
until you decided whether you were going to sell it or not, in sub-
stance; is that right?




23-. Id. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. This comment assumes that
the insured can comply with conspicuous, unambiguous aviation exclusions. The
comment does not apply to "fine print" exclusions or exclusions that cannot rea-
sonably be complied with by the insured. Thus, by not complying, the insured
willfully or negligently abandons coverage.
234 See supra note 1. Of the minority jurisdictions that require a causal connec-
tion with aviation exclusions, only Texas and Colorado put the burden of proof
on the insured to prove that a causal connection does not exist. See O'Connor v.
Proprietors Ins. Co., 696 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1985) (en banc). See also Ideal Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Last Days Evangelical Ass'n., 783 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying
Texas law). Arguably because the Texas Supreme Court has not addressed the
burden of proof issue, the burden could be on the insurer. However, the Fifth
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by passing on to the aggregate of insureds the added ex-
pense of litigating a causal connection, and by removing
an important incentive to comply with FAA regulations.
Insureds who comply and pay for their airplanes' annual
inspection should not be required to pay higher premi-
ums for the negligent or wilful noncompliance of others.
Circuit ruled in Ideal that the Texas Supreme Court would put the causation bur-
den on the insured. Id. at 1237. Even if the burden is on the insured, premiums
must still increase because of expenses involved in litigating the causal connection
issue.
